Let’s talk about reality and inertia in a government organization, then. Those two words are why the Independent Review Team’s (IRT’s) satellite “gap-filler” recommendation in its 2013 assessment will turn out to be a lot more taxpayer money spent with miniscule return. The reality is the IRT’s recommendation is to and for the National Oceanographic […]Read More NOAA’s low hanging problem–Part 8
The last post, part 6, went into detail about the problems the Independent Review Team (IRT) brought forward to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) regarding its satellite programs. These were the problems the IRT found and documented in their 2012 assessment report: Oversight and decision process, governance, JPSS Gap, programs, and budget. The […]Read More NOAA’s low hanging problem–Part 7
You learned from the previous post the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration invited the Independent Review Team (IRT) to find issues in their satellite programs, like the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS), which were causing program slowdowns and costing more money. The IRT found five different concerns: Oversight and decision process, governance, JPSS Gap, programs, […]Read More NOAA’s low hanging problem–Part 6
Last lesson, you learned a little bit about satellite busses and bus-driving. Almost all satellite busses are similar to each other. If you looked at a RapidEye satellite bus specifications and a Digitalglobe satellite bus, you’d likely think they might be one and the same. But the payload is different. The satellite payload (and orbit) […]Read More Why space matters: Imaging satellite operations, part 11—Payloads and programs—the lesson that won’t get learned.